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Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman∗ 
The British sociologist, T.H. Marshall famously described 
citizenship as a “basic human equality associated with . . . full 
membership of a community.”1  He went on to describe citizenship as 
“the architect of . . . social inequality.”2  By this he meant that the 
inequalities that arise under particular institutions of citizenship appear 
natural and justified.  Such inequalities are the immediate result of the 
rules of belonging to a given community.  The injustice of such 
institutionalized inequalities runs counter to conventional intuitions, and 
remedies are difficult to conceive and implement. 
Since the zenith of the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960s, the 
character and extent of American citizenship have been redrawn by the 
steady growth in the penal population.  The emergence of mass 
imprisonment—historically high and concentrated rates of 
incarceration—represents a new type of institutionalized inequality.  As 
in Marshall’s formulation, the inequality arising under these new rules of 
citizenship (to the extent it is visible at all) seems justified, delivering 
harsh punishment to those who flout the law. 
In this Article, we trace the causes, contours, and consequences of 
the American prison boom.  We argue that rapid growth in the penal 
system was fueled by a punitive turn in punishment and the deteriorating 
economic situation of black men and men with low levels of education.  
The explosion in prison and jail populations was felt most acutely by 
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those who were already most disadvantaged—black men and men with 
low levels of educational attainment and their families.  As a result, by 
the late 1990s, serving time in prison had become commonplace for 
young black men who had never been to college.  For these same men’s 
wives, girlfriends, and children, contact with the penal system has also 
become common in the last ten years. 
Such inequalities are particularly fundamental.  Their remedy may 
lie more in the social policies that can expand social citizenship than in 
one-time transfers, like reparations, or surface reforms of the justice 
system.  We close by suggesting that a reversal of mass incarceration 
will involve changes in both criminal justice policy, and the broader 
social policy regime in which criminal justice is embedded.  While recent 
developments in the area of prisoner reentry policy foreshadow a 
progressive current in criminal justice politics and policy, a retreat from 
mass incarceration will ultimately depend on the expansion of 
employment opportunities for low-skill men, and a reinvigoration of the 
moral status of these men in political debate.  These political and 
economic developments remain well beyond the scope of criminal justice 
policy. 
I. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROOTS OF THE PRISON BOOM3 
Mass imprisonment of the late 1990s can be traced to two basic 
shifts in politics and economics.  The growth of harsh sentencing policies 
and a punitive approach to drug control began with a rightward shift in 
American politics, first visible at the national level in the mid-1960s.  
Barry Goldwater’s fated presidential run in 1964 was pivotal.4  
Goldwater, in accepting the Republican nomination, warned that crime 
and disorder were threats to human freedom and freedom must be 
“balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the license of the 
mob and of the jungle.”5  The Republican campaign of 1964 linked the 
problem of street crime to civil rights protest and the growing unease 
among whites about racial violence.  Although Goldwater was roundly 
defeated by Lyndon Johnson, conservatives within the Republican Party 
had brought to the national stage a new kind of politics.  Historically, 
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responsibilities for crime control were divided mostly between state and 
local agencies.  The Republicans had placed the issue of crime squarely 
on the national agenda.  What’s more, by treating civil rights protest as a 
strain of social disorder, veiled connections were drawn between the 
crime problem on the one hand, and black social protest on the other. 
The social problem of crime became a reality as rates of murder and 
other violence escalated in the decade following the 1964 election.  
Through the 1960s, urban riots in Los Angeles, New York, Newark, 
Detroit, and dozens of other cities provided a socially ambiguous mixture 
of disorder and politics.  Despite Goldwater’s defeat, support grew for 
the new law and order message, particularly among southern whites and 
northern working class voters of Irish, Italian, and German descent who 
turned away from the Democratic Party in the 1970s.6 
Elevated crime rates and the realigned race relations of the post-Civil 
Rights period provided a receptive context for the law-and-order themes 
of the Republican Party.  In state politics, Republican governors and 
legislators increased their representation through the South and West, 
and placed themselves in the vanguard of the movements for mandatory 
minimum sentences, sentence enhancements for repeat offenders, and 
expanded prison capacity.7  Quantitative analyses show that incarceration 
rates grew fastest under Republican governors and state legislators.8  
Republicans were quick to promote prison expansion and tough new 
criminal sentences, but Democrats also came to support punitive criminal 
justice policy.  Perhaps the clearest signal that Democrats too were tough 
on crime was sent by President Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994.  The Clinton crime bill earmarked $9.9 billion 
for prison construction and added life terms for third-time federal felons.9  
By the 1990s, Democrats and Republicans had come to support the 
sentencing policies and capital construction campaigns that grew the 
penal population. 
Shifts in politics and policy, however, are only half the story.  The 
newly punitive system of criminal sentencing would have had largely 
symbolic significance, but for the ready supply of chronically idle young 
men that came to swell the nation’s prisons and jails.  Urban 
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5.0 WESTERN FINAL 4/23/2009  1:19:28 PM 
854 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
deindustrialization eroded the labor market for unskilled young men 
while punitive politics gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Wilson’s study of The Truly Disadvantaged provides the classic 
analysis.10  The decline of manufacturing industry employment in the 
Midwest and the Northeast coupled with the exodus of the middle class 
and working class blacks from inner cities produced pockets of severe 
unemployment in poor urban neighborhoods.  From 1969 to 1979, 
central cities recorded enormous declines in manufacturing and blue 
collar employment.  New York, for example, lost 170,000 blue collar 
jobs through the 1970s, another 120,000 jobs were shed in Chicago, and 
blue collar employment in Detroit fell by 90,000 jobs.11  For young men 
in metropolitan areas, employment rates fell by thirty percent among 
black high school dropouts and nearly twenty percent among black high 
school graduates.12  Job loss was only a third as large among young non-
college whites.13 
Variation in imprisonment is closely linked to variation in wages and 
employment.  Weekly earnings for young low-education men declined 
through the 1980s and 1990s while imprisonment rates were rising.  
Among black men, unemployment increased steeply with declining 
education.  One study estimates that if wages and employment had not 
declined among low-education men since the early 1980s, growth in 
prison admission rates would have been reduced by as much as twenty-
five percent by 2001.14 
The urban deindustrialization that produced the raw material for the 
prison boom was as much a failure of institutions as a failure of markets.  
Large job losses in the mid-1970s and early 1980s were concentrated in 
unionized industries.15  Deunionization thus joined manufacturing 
decline to drive down the incomes of unskilled inner city workers.  
Besides unemployment insurance, which provided only temporary 
assistance, few social programs were available to supplement the 
incomes, retrain, or mobilize young able-bodied men into new jobs.  The 
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 14. Bruce Western, Meredith Kleykamp, & Jake Rosenfeld, Crime, Punishment, 
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 15. See generally Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in 
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welfare system was also poorly-equipped to handle the social problems 
linked to male unemployment.  Drug addiction, petty offending, and 
public idleness all afflicted the neighborhoods of concentrated 
disadvantage. 
Idle young men in poor minority neighborhoods supplied a large 
share of the inmates that drove the prison boom.  The path from 
concentrated economic disadvantage to mass imprisonment runs partly 
through the mechanism of crime, but policy also played a vital role.  At 
any given point in time, crime among young disadvantaged men is higher 
than in the rest of the population.  For example, the victimization and 
offending rates for murder are about twenty-five times higher for black 
men aged eighteen to twenty-four than for white men aged twenty-five 
and older.16  Violent crime is also a more serious problem in poor 
communities than affluent communities.17  The criminal involvement of 
young, economically disadvantaged men makes them more likely at a 
given point in time to go to prison than others who are less involved in 
crime.  Crime cannot explain, however, why disadvantaged young men 
were so much more likely to go to prison by the end of the 1990s than 
two decades earlier.  Indeed, survey data show that poor male youth were 
much less involved in crime at the height of the prison boom, in 2000, 
than at its inception in 1980.  To explain the growing risk of 
imprisonment over time, the role of policy is decisive.  Because the 
system of criminal sentencing had come to rely so heavily on 
incarceration, an arrest in the late 1990s was far more likely to lead to 
prison time than at the beginning of the prison boom in 1980.18 
The drug trade holds a special place in this story.  The drug trade 
itself became a source of economic opportunity in the jobless ghetto.  
Ethnographers paint striking pictures of how the inner-city drug trade 
becomes a focal point for the problems of economic disadvantage, 
violence, and state control.  Sudhir Venkatesh and Steven Levitt describe 
how drug trafficking thrived in the vacuum of legitimate employment in 
Chicago’s southside neighborhoods.19  Chicago youth spoke to 
Venkatesh and Levitt “of their gang affiliation and their drive to earn 
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 19. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh & Steven D. Levitt, “Are We a Family or a Business?” History 
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income in ways that resonated with representations of work in the 
mainstream corporate firm.  Many approached [gang] involvement as an 
institutionalized path of socioeconomic mobility for down-and-out 
youth . . . .”20  In Elijah Anderson’s account, violence follows the drug 
trade as crime becomes a voracious force in the poor neighborhoods of 
Philadelphia: 
Surrounded by violence and by indifference to the innocent victims of 
drug dealers and users alike, the decent people are finding it harder and 
harder to maintain a sense of community.  Thus violence comes to 
regulate life in the drug-infested neighborhoods and the putative 
neighborhood leaders are increasingly the people who control the 
violence.21 
The picture drawn by the ethnographic research is of poor 
neighborhoods, chronically short of legitimate work and embedded in a 
violent and illegal market for drugs. 
High rates of joblessness and crime and a flourishing street trade in 
illegal drugs combined with harsher criminal penalties and intensified 
urban policing to produce high incarceration rates among young 
unskilled men in inner cities.  In the twenty-five years following 1980, 
the incarceration rate tripled among white men in their twenties, but 
fewer than two percent were behind bars by 2004.  Imprisonment rates 
for young black men increased less quickly, but one in seven were in 
custody by 2004.  Incarceration rates are much higher among male high 
school dropouts in their twenties.  Threefold growth in the imprisonment 
of young white male dropouts left seven percent in prison or jail by 2004.  
The incarceration rate for young low-education black men rose by 
twenty-two points in the two decades after 1980.  Incredibly, thirty-four 
percent of all young black male high school dropouts were in prison or 
jail on an average day in 2004, an incarceration rate forty times higher 
than the national average. 
Tough sentences for drug and repeat offenders, strict policing and 
prosecution of drug traffic and public order offending, and unforgiving 
parole supervision broadened the use of imprisonment from its 
traditional focus on serious crime.  Certainly sentences increased for 
serious crime, and this contributed to incarceration rates too.  For 
example, time served for murderers increased from five to eleven years 
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THE INNER CITY 134 (1999). 
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from 1980 to 1996.22  But growth in the share of less serious offenders in 
state prison increased much more rapidly.23  Growth in the numbers of 
drug offenders, parole violators, and public order offenders reflects the 
use of penal policy as a surrogate social policy, in which a troublesome 
and unruly population is increasingly managed with incarceration. 
II. MASS INCARCERATION 
The scale of the penal system is usually measured by an 
incarceration rate.  The incarceration rate records the number of people 
in prison or jail on a given day per 100,000 of the population.  Figure 1 
compares the U.S. incarceration rate in 2004 to the incarceration rates of 
the longstanding democracies of Western Europe.  The penal systems of 
Western Europe locked up, on average, about 100 per 100,000.  The 
United States by contrast incarcerated more than seven times the 
European average, with an incarceration rate of around 725 per 100,000. 
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 23. Id. at 24, 37. 
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Figure 1: 2004 Incarceration Rates per 100,000 Residents: United States 
and Western Europe24 
 
The contemporary scale of criminal punishment is also historically 
unusual.  Although we do not have long time series of the total penal 
population of prison and jail inmates, there are data on the state and 
federal prison populations extending back to 1925.  The time series in 
Figure 2 shows that between 1925 and 1973, the fraction of the U.S. 
population in state and federal prison varied in a narrow range around 
100 per 100,000—close to the total incarceration rates in Western 
Europe.  From 1974, the prison population began to grow, and the 
incarceration rate increased continuously for the next three decades.  By 
2005, nearly 2.2 million people were in custody, either in prison for 
felony convictions, or in local jails awaiting trial or serving short 
sentences.  These figures do not fully reflect the contemporary 
correctional population.  In 2005, another 784,000 men and women were 
under community supervision on parole while 4.1 million people were on 
                                                          
 24. Marcelo F. Aebi, Council of Europe, 14th Conference of Directors of Prison 
Administration: Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics—2006 Survey (Nov. 19, 2007), available 
at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_co_operation/prisons_and_alternatives/conferences/cdap%20(2007) 
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probation.  The total population under correctional supervision thus 
includes more than 7.1 million people, or about 3.1 % of all U.S. adults.25 
 
Figure 2: U.S. State and Federal Imprisonment Rates, 1925–2007; U.S. 
Prison and Jail Incarceration Rates, 1983–200526 
 
The broad significance of the penal system for American social 
inequality results from extreme social and economic disparities in 
incarceration.  More than ninety percent of all prison and jail inmates are 
men.  Women’s incarceration rates have increased more quickly than 
men’s since 1980, but much higher rates persist for men, leaving women 
to contend with raising children while their partners cycle in and out of 
jail.  These men are young, of working age, and many with small 
                                                          
 25. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION 
AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES (2008), available at 
http://www.jp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 (2007), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. 
 26. WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf; 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (Anne L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section3.pdf. 
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children.  About two-thirds of state prisoners are over eighteen years old 
but under age thirty-five.  With this age pattern, only a small number of 
people are incarcerated at any point in time, but many more pass through 
the penal system at some point in their lives. 
Incarceration is also concentrated among the disadvantaged.  High 
incarceration rates among low-status and minority men are unmistakable.  
The 2004 survey of state and federal prisoners shows that state inmates 
average less than eleven years of schooling.  A third were not working at 
the time of their incarceration, and the average wage of the remainder is 
much lower than that of other men with the same level of education.  
Blacks and Hispanics also have higher incarceration rates than whites.  
Blacks and Hispanics together account for about two-thirds of the state 
prison population. 
The black-white difference in incarceration rates is especially 
striking.  Black men are eight times more likely to be incarcerated than 
whites and large racial disparities can be seen for all age groups and at 
different levels of education.  The large black-white disparity in 
incarceration is unmatched by most other social indicators.  Racial 
disparities in unemployment (2 to 1), nonmarital childbearing (3 to 1), 
infant mortality (2 to 1), and wealth (1 to 5) are all significantly lower 
than the 8 to 1 black-white ratio in incarceration rates.  If white men 
were incarcerated at the same rate as blacks there would be over six 
million people in prison and jail, and the incarceration rate would include 
more than five percent of the male working-age population.27 
“Age, race, and educational disparities concentrate imprisonment 
among the disadvantaged.”28  From 1980 to 2004, the percentage of 
young white men in prison or jail increased from 0.6% to 1.9%.29  
Among young white men with only a high school education, 
incarceration rates were about twice as high.30  At the dawn of the prison 
boom, in 1980, the incarceration rate for young black men at 5.7% was 
more than twice as high as that for low education whites.  By 2004, 
13.5% of black men in their twenties were in prison or jail.  Incarceration 
rates were higher in the lower half of the education distribution.  More 
than one in five young non-college black men were behind bars on a 
typical day in 2004. 
Incarceration rates offer a snapshot of the extent of penal 
confinement.  Time series of incarceration rates tell us how the extent of 
                                                          
 27. WESTERN, supra note 7, at 16. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 17. 
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penal confinement has shifted historically.  We can also study, not the 
level of incarceration at a point in time, but how the risk of incarceration 
accumulates over an individual’s life.  This kind of life course analysis 
asks what is the likelihood an individual will go to prison by age twenty-
five, thirty, or thirty-five.  Instead of providing a snapshot of the risk of 
incarceration, this analysis describes a typical biography. 
The life course perspective provides a compelling account of social 
integration.  In this account, the passage to adulthood is a sequence of 
well-ordered stages that affect life trajectories long after the early 
transitions are completed.  In modern times, arriving at adult status 
involves moving from school to work, then to marriage, then to 
establishing a home and becoming a parent.  Completing this sequence 
without delay promotes stable employment, marriage, and other positive 
life outcomes.  The process of becoming an adult thus influences success 
in fulfilling adult roles and responsibilities. 
As an account of social integration, life course analysis has attracted 
the interest of students of crime and deviance.  Criminologists point to 
the normalizing effects of life course transitions.  Steady jobs and good 
marriages build social bonds that keep would-be offenders in a daily 
routine.31  They enmesh men who are tempted by crime in a web of 
supportive social relationships.32  Strong family bonds and steady work 
restrict men’s opportunities for antisocial behavior and offer them a stake 
in normal life.33  For persistent law-breakers, the adult roles of spouse 
and worker offer a pathway out of crime.34  Those who fail to secure the 
markers of adulthood are more likely to persist in criminal behavior.  
This idea of a normalizing, integrative, life path offers a powerful 
alternative to claims that criminality is a stable trait possessed by some, 
but absent in others.  Above all else, the life course account of crime is 
dynamic, describing how people change as their social context evolves 
with age. 
Imprisonment significantly alters the life course.  Working life is 
disrupted as workers with prison records try to find jobs from employers 
who are deeply suspicious of applicants with criminal records.  The 
stigma of a prison record also creates legal barriers to skilled and 
                                                          
 31. ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING 
POINTS THROUGH LIFE 141 (1993); John Hagan, The Social Embeddedness of Crime and 
Unemployment, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 465, 471−72 (1993); Mark Warr, Life-Course Transitions and 
Desistance from Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 187 (1998). 
 32. See sources cited supra note 31. 
 33. See id. 
 34.   See id. 
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licensed occupations, rights to welfare benefits, and voting rights.35  Ex-
prisoners are also less likely to get married or cohabit with the mothers 
of their children.36  By eroding opportunities for employment and 
marriage, incarceration may also lead ex-inmates back to a life of crime.  
The volatility of adolescence may last well into mid-life for men serving 
prison time.  In short, imprisonment is a turning point in which young 
crime-involved men acquire a new status involving diminished life 
chances. 
To place the risks of imprisonment in the context of the life course, 
we report estimates of the cumulative risks of imprisonment by age thirty 
to thirty-four, for five year birth cohorts born through the postwar period.  
Because most inmates enter prison for the first time before age thirty-
five, these cumulative risks of imprisonment roughly describe lifetime 
risks of imprisonment.  We emphasize that these lifetime risks of 
incarceration are for imprisonment, as opposed to jail incarceration.  
Imprisonment here describes a sentence of twelve months or longer for a 
felony conviction, now about twenty-eight months of time served, at the 
median. 
 
                                                          
 36. Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of 
Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721 (2005). 
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Table 1: Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 30–34 by Race and 
Education for Men Born 1945–1949 to 1975–197937 















White Men        
 High School 
Dropouts 
4.2 7.2 8.0 8.0 10.5 14.8 15.3 
 High School 
Only 
0.7 2.0 2.1 2.5 4.0 3.8 4.1 
 All Non-College 1.8 2.9 3.2 3.7 5.1 5.1 6.3 
 Some College 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.2 
 All Men 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.3 
        
Black Men        
 High School 
Dropouts 
14.7 19.6 27.6 41.6 57.0 62.5 69.0 
 High School 
Only 
10.2 11.3 9.4 12.4 16.8 20.3 18.0 
 All Non-College 12.1 14.1 14.7 19.9 26.7 30.9 35.7 
 Some College 4.9 3.5 4.3 5.5 6.8 8.5 7.6 
 All Men 9.0 10.6 11.5 15.2 20.3 22.8 20.7 
 
The oldest cohort was born just after World War Two and reached 
their mid-thirties in 1979, just at the take-off of the prison boom.  In this 
group, just over one percent of whites and nine percent of blacks would 
go to prison.  As incarceration rates climbed through the 1980s, lifetime 
imprisonment risks also increased.  The big jump in imprisonment 
separates men born in the 1950s and earlier from those born in the 1960s 
and later.  The pervasive presence of the criminal justice system in the 
lives of black men only emerges among those born since the mid-1960s, 
who are reaching their mid-thirties from the end of the 1990s.  Like the 
long time series of incarceration rates, these figures on postwar birth 
cohorts underscore the historic novelty of mass incarceration.  Only 
through the 1990s, did the penal system figure prominently in the lives of 
young black men. 
                                                          
 37. Data sources and methods are described in Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass 
Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. 
REV. 151 (2004).  Estimates for the cohorts born after 1969 are based on data from the 2004 Survey 
on Inmates of States and Federal Correctional Facilities. 
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Like incarceration rates, lifetime risks of imprisonment are also 
steeply stratified by education.  We report cumulative risks of 
imprisonment for men who have had at least some college education and 
for all those with just a high school education.  Among those with just a 
high school education, we separate high school dropouts and high school 
graduates.  We report figures for all non-college men because—
particularly for blacks—those without college education have remained 
an approximately constant proportion of the population.  Educational 
attainment has increased across birth cohorts chiefly because the 
proportion of high school dropouts has declined. 
Lifetime risks of imprisonment among black men with little 
schooling are particularly striking.  For non-college black men, about 
twelve percent of those born just after the War would ultimately go to 
prison.  For those born thirty years later, reaching their thirties in 2005, at 
least thirty-six percent would serve prison time.38  At the very bottom of 
the education distribution, among high school dropouts, prison time has 
become extraordinarily prevalent.  For black male dropouts born since 
the mid-1960s, sixty to seventy percent go to prison.  For this very 
poorly schooled segment of the population, serving time in prison has 
become a routine life event on the pathway through adulthood.  Indeed 
we need only go back several decades to find a time when incarceration 
was not pervasive in the lives of young black men with little schooling. 
Detailed figures on the racial and educational differences in 
imprisonment also show another pattern.  While lifetime risks of 
imprisonment grew three-fold for men without a college education, 
imprisonment among the college-educated less than doubled.  In short, 
most of the growth in imprisonment was concentrated among those with 
little schooling.  At the same time racial disparities in imprisonment 
risks, while large, did not increase significantly.  The figures thus 
indicate that in the period of the prison boom, class inequality in 
incarceration clearly increased, but racial inequality did not.  Because 
racial disparities in imprisonment were so large to begin with, however, 
the prison boom produced extraordinarily high rates of incarceration 
among young non-college black men. 
 
                                                          
 38. This is actually a slight under-estimate, because those born between 1975 and 1979 have 
not been exposed to the risk of imprisonment for as long as the older cohorts. 
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Table 2: Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black and White Men, Born 1965–
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From a life course perspective we can compare imprisonment to 
other significant life events that are commonly thought to mark the path 
through young adulthood.  Life course researchers have previously 
studied college graduation, military service, and marriage as key 
milestones that move young men forward in life to establishing a 
household and a steady job.  Comparing imprisonment to these life 
events suggests how the pathway through adulthood has been changed by 
the prison boom.  The risks of each life event are different for blacks and 
whites, but racial differences in imprisonment greatly overshadow any 
other inequality.  Whites by their early thirties are more than twice as 
likely to hold a bachelor’s degree than blacks.  Blacks are about fifty 
percent more likely to have served in the military.  However, black men 
in their early thirties are about seven times more likely than whites to 
have a prison record.  Indeed, recent birth cohorts of black men are more 
likely to have prison records (22.4%) than military records (17.4%) or 
bachelor’s degrees (12.5%).  The share of the population with prison 
records is particularly striking among non-college men.  Whereas few 
non-college white men have prison records, nearly a third of black men 
with less than a college education have been to prison.  Non-college 
                                                          
 39. The incidence of all life events except prison incarceration were calculated from the 2000 
Census.  To make the incarceration risks comparable to Census statistics, the estimates are adjusted 
to describe the percentage of men, born 1965–1969, who have ever been imprisoned and survived to 
1999.  Pettit & Western, supra note 37. 
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black men in their early thirties in 1999 were more than twice as likely to 
be ex-felons than veterans.  By 1999 imprisonment had become a 
common life event for black men that sharply distinguished their 
pathway through adulthood from that of white men. 
David Garland coined the term “mass imprisonment” to refer to the 
high rate of incarceration in the contemporary United States.  In 
Garland’s definition, mass imprisonment has two characteristics.  First, 
“[m]ass imprisonment implies a rate of imprisonment . . . that is 
markedly above the historical and comparative norm for societies of this 
type.”40  Indeed, we have seen that the rate of incarceration in America 
by the late 1990s was far higher than in Western Europe and without 
precedent in U.S. history.  Second, Garland argues, the demographic 
concentration of imprisonment produces not the incarceration of 
individual offenders, but the “systematic imprisonment of whole groups 
of the population.”41  The empirical markers of mass imprisonment are 
more slippery in this case. 
When will the incarceration rate be high enough to imprison not the 
individual but the group?  The picture painted by the statistics in this 
paper helps us answer this question.  Not only did incarceration become 
common among young black men at the end of the 1990s, its prevalence 
exceeded that of other life events that we usually associate with passage 
through the life course.  More than college graduation or military service, 
incarceration typified the biographies of black men born since the late 
1960s. 
III. MASS INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE 
As imprisonment became common for low-education black men by 
the end of the 1990s, the penal system also became familiar to poor 
minority families.  By 1999, thirty percent of non-college black men in 
their mid-thirties had been to prison and, through incarceration, many 
were separated from their wives, girlfriends, and children.  Women and 
children in low-income urban communities now routinely cope with 
absent husbands and fathers lost to incarceration and adjust to their 
return after release.  Poor single men detached from family life are also 
affected, bearing the stigma of a prison record in the marriage markets of 
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. 
                                                          
 40. David Garland, Introduction to MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (David Garland ed., 2001). 
 41. Id. at 2. 
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Discussions of the family life of criminal offenders typically focus 
on the crime-suppressing effects of marriage, not the effects of 
incarceration on family life.  Researchers find that marriage offers a 
pathway out of crime for men with histories of delinquency.  Not a 
wedding itself, but marriage in the context of a warm, stable, and 
constructive relationship offers the antidote to crime.42  Wives and family 
members in such relationships provide the web of obligations and 
responsibilities that restrain young men and reduce their contact with the 
male friends whose recreations veer into anti-social behavior.43  The 
prison boom places the link between crime and marriage in a new light.  
If a good marriage is important for criminal desistance, what is the effect 
of incarceration on marriage? 
The connections between incarceration, marriage, and the family are 
also implicated in the larger story of rising urban inequality.  In the last 
three decades, American family life was transformed by declining 
marriage rates and growth in the number of single-parent households.  
Marriage rates fell among women from all class backgrounds.  Between 
1970 and 2000, the share of white women aged twenty-five to thirty-four 
who were married declined from over eighty percent to just over sixty 
percent.  Marriage rates for black women halved from sixty to around 
thirty percent.  The decline in marriage propelled growth in the number 
of single-parent households, although this effect was confined to those 
with little education.44  The share of college-educated women who were 
single mothers remained constant at around five percent between 1970 
and 2000, while the fraction of single mothers among low-education 
white women increased from eight to eighteen percent.  Trends were 
most dramatic among black women.  In 1970, about one-third of low-
education black women were single parents, but the number increased to 
over fifty percent in the next thirty years.  By 2000, stable two-parent 
households became relatively rare, especially among blacks with little 
schooling. 
Poverty researchers closely followed the changing shape of 
American families.  Growing numbers of female-headed families 
increased the risks of enduring poverty for women and children.  
                                                          
 42. See John H. Laub et al., Trajectories of Change in Criminal Offending: Good Marriages 
and the Desistance Process, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 225 (1998); SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note 31, at 
205−09, 211−14, 217−20, 224−25, 227−28, 232−42. 
 43. Warr, supra note 31, at 188−96 (positing that marriage disrupts or dissolves friendships that 
existed prior to marriage, including relationships with criminal offenders). 
 44. David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent 
Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look For Answers?, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY, supra 
note 14, at 3. 
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Growing up poor also raised a child’s risk of school failure, poor health, 
and delinquency.  Writing in the mid-1980s, William Julius Wilson 
traced the growth in the number of female-headed black families to the 
shrinking number of “marriageable men” in poor urban areas.45  The 
shortage of suitable husbands in ghetto neighborhoods was driven by two 
processes.  High rates of male incarceration and mortality tilted the 
gender ratio, making it harder for poor urban women to find partners.  
These effects were small, however, compared to the high rate of 
joblessness that left few black men in inner cities able to support a 
family.  Many studies later examined the impact of men’s employment 
on marriage rates and found that the unemployed are less likely to be 
married and that joblessness can increase chances of divorce or 
separation.46  Studies of the effects of employment dominated research 
on marriage among the disadvantaged, and the idea that incarceration 
destabilized family life was undeveloped. 
To study the family ties of prisoners, we begin by simply describing 
the levels of marriage and fatherhood in the penal population.  Figure 3 
compares rates of marriage and fatherhood in the penal population to 
those for men who are not incarcerated.  Levels of marriage are 
measured for non-institutional men and male prison and jail inmates, 
aged twenty-two to thirty, in 2000.  Rates of fatherhood are the 
percentage of non-institutional men and male state prisoners, aged thirty-
three to forty, who have ever had children by 1997−1998. 
Marriage rates among prison and jail inmates are very low compared 
to those on the outside.  White male inmates in their twenties are less 
than half as likely to be married as young white non-institutional men of 
the same age.  The incarceration gap in marriage is also large for black 
and Hispanic men.  The general level of marriage is highest for 
Hispanics, but in this case, inmates are only half as likely to be married 
as their counterparts in the non-institutional population.  Although 
marriage rates are lowest for black men, only eleven percent of young 
black inmates are married compared to a marriage rate of twenty-five 
percent among young black men outside of prison and jail.  In short, 
marriage rates among male prisoners in their twenties are only around 
                                                          
 45. See WILSON, supra note 10, at 91 (“[B]lack women, especially young black women, are 
facing a shrinking pool of ‘marriageable’ (i.e., economically stable) men.”). 
 46. E.g., Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding Young Women’s Marriage Decisions: The Role 
of Labor and Marriage Market Conditions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 624 (2000); Daniel T. 
Lichter et al., Local Marriage Markets and the Marital Behavior of Black and White Women, 96 AM. 
J. SOC. 843 (1991); Sara McLanahan & Lynne Casper, Growing Diversity and Inequality in the 
American Family, in 2 STATE OF THE UNION, AMERICA IN THE 1990S: SOCIAL TRENDS 1 (Reynolds 
Farley ed., 1995). 
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half as high as in the free population. 
 
Figure 3: The Percentage of Men, Aged 22–30, Who Are Married in 
2000 and Men, Aged 33–40, Who Are Fathers by 1997–1998.47 
 
Although marriage is uncommon among prisoners, they are just as 
likely as other men to have children.  Figure 3 shows the percentage of 
men who have ever had children by their late thirties.  The prevalence of 
fatherhood among prisoners is almost identical to that on the outside.  
For example, seventy-three percent of non-institutional black men have 
had children by their late thirties compared to seventy percent of black 
male prisoners of the same age.  Male fertility rates among prisoners and 
nonprisoners are also very similar for whites and Hispanics. 
The combination of high incarceration rates with a large proportion 
of fathers among inmates means many children now have incarcerated 
fathers.  Data from surveys of prison and jail inmates can be used to 
calculate the numbers of children with fathers in prison or jail.  A time 
series for 1980 to 2000 shows that the total number of children with 
incarcerated fathers increased sixfold from about 350,000 to 2.1 million, 
                                                          
 47.  WESTERN, supra note 7, at 137. 
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nearly 3% of all children nationwide in 2000.  Among whites, the 
fraction of children with a father in prison or jail is relatively small—
about 1.2% in 2000.  The figure is about three times higher (3.5%) for 
Hispanics.  Among blacks, over a million, or one in eleven, black 
children had a father in prison or jail in 2000.  The numbers are higher 
for younger children: by 2000, 10.4% of black children under age ten had 
a father in prison or jail.  Just as incarceration has become a normal life 
event for disadvantaged young black men, parental incarceration has 
become commonplace for their children. 
To better gauge the impact of mass incarceration on children, we 
report the cumulative risks that one of their parents will be sent to prison.  
We also report these risks of parental incarceration for black and white 
children of parents at different levels of education.  Just as lifetime risks 
of imprisonment help describe the life course of adults, cumulative risks 
of parental imprisonment tell us about the early life course of children. 
These figures include incarceration among mothers as well as 
fathers.  The rapid growth in incarceration among women is reflected in 
these figures.  Although incarceration rates among mothers are much 
lower than those for fathers, the effects of maternal imprisonment on 
parental separation from children are relatively large.  Whereas just 
under half of fathers were living with their children at the time they were 
sent to prison, nearly two-thirds of mothers sent to prison were living 
with their children.48 
Table 3 reports the risks of parental imprisonment by age fourteen 
for children born in 1978 and 1990.49  Among white children born in 
1978 who reached their teenage years in the early 1990s, around two 
percent experienced a parent being sent to prison.  Among black children 
born in the same year, around fourteen percent had a parent sent to prison 
by age fifteen.  Twelve years later, among children born in 1990, about a 
quarter of all black children had a parent sent to prison.  Indeed, the 
proportion of black children who had a mother sent to prison (a relatively 
rare event) nearly equaled the proportion of white children who had a 
father sent to prison. 
 
                                                          
 48. Christopher J. Mumola, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN 3 (2000). 
 49. Christopher Wildeman, Parental Imprisonment, the Prison Boom, and the Concentration of 
Childhood Disadvantage, DEMOGRAPHY (forthcoming 2009). 
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Table 3: Cumulative Risks of Paternal and Maternal Imprisonment for 
Children Born in 1978 and 1990, by Parent’s Race and Education50 
 
 Whites Blacks 
 Maternal Paternal Maternal Paternal 
Born 1978     
 All 0.2 2.1 1.4 13.4 
 High School 
Dropout 
0.2 4.0 1.9 21.4 
 High School 
Graduate 
0.2 2.0 0.9 9.9 
 All Non-College 0.2 2.8 1.5 15.1 
 Some College 0.2 1.4 1.2 7.1 
     
Born 1990     
 All 0.6 3.6 3.2 24.5 
 High School 
Dropout 
1.0 7.1 5.0 49.4 
 High School 
Graduate 
0.7 4.7 2.6 20.0 
 All Non-College 0.8 5.5 3.6 24.5 
 Some College 0.3 1.7 2.6 13.2 
 
The children of low-education parents were far more exposed to the 
criminal justice system than the population in general.  These estimates 
indicate that among children born in the late 1970s with non-college 
black parents, about one in seven had a parent sent to prison by the time 
they reached their teenage years.  Just over a decade later, over a quarter 
of the children of non-college black parents experienced parental 
imprisonment.  For black children whose parents dropped out of high 
school, around half had a parent sent to prison by the early 2000s.  Just 
as imprisonment had become a normal life event for young black male 
dropouts, so had parental imprisonment become normal for their 
children. 
The prevalence of marriage and fatherhood among prison and jail 
inmates tells us something about the incapacitation effect of 
incarceration.  Men behind bars cannot fully play the role of father and 
husband.  Single incarcerated men are unlikely to get married while they 
                                                          
 50. Sources, methods, and figures are reported in Wildeman, supra note 49. 
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are locked up.  On the outside, the incapacitation effect takes the form of 
lopsided gender ratios of poor communities.  For example, in the high-
incarceration neighborhoods of Washington D.C. there are only sixty-
two men for every hundred women.51  Studying U.S. counties, William 
Sabol and James Lynch quantify the effects of the removal of men to 
prison.52  After accounting for educational attainment, welfare receipt, 
poverty, employment and crime, Sabol and Lynch found that the 
doubling of the number of black men admitted to prison between 1980 
and 1990 was associated with a nineteen percent increase in the number 
of families headed by black women.53 
The incapacitation effect captures only part of the impact of the 
prison boom on marriage.  In Wilson’s terms, incarceration also damages 
men’s marriageability.  Wilson traced declining marriage rates among 
the ghetto poor to the increasing inability of young disadvantaged black 
men to support families.54  Incarceration erodes men’s economic 
desirability even more.  Incarceration reduces men’s wages, slows the 
rate of wage growth, increases unemployment, and shortens job tenure.  
If a poor employment record damages the marriage prospects of single 
men and contributes to the risk of divorce among those who are married, 
the economic effects of incarceration will decrease the likelihood of 
marriage among men who have been to prison and jail. 
Wilson measured marriageability mostly by employment, but a 
man’s criminal record also signals his ability to care for and provide for 
his family.  While poor women care about men’s economic status, they 
also worry about men’s honesty and respectability.  Edin’s ethnographic 
interviews showed that these non-economic concerns weighed heavily on 
low-income women in metropolitan Philadelphia.55  The women Edin 
interviewed were deeply distrustful of men.  The respondents were often 
reluctant to marry or develop romantic relationships because they viewed 
men’s marital infidelity as inevitable.56  Some women’s trust in men was 
shaken by boyfriends who spent household savings on drugs or drink, 
                                                          
 51. DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN 
URBAN AMERICA 85 (2004). 
 52. William J. Sabol & James P. Lynch, Assessing the Longer-Run Consequences of 
Incarceration: Effects on Families and Unemployment, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
THE DELICATE BALANCE 3 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003). 
 53. Id. at 17. 
 54. WILSON, supra note 10, at 83−92. 
 55. Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don’t Marry or Remarry, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 26. 
 56. Id. at 29. 
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and neglected children in their care.57  This wariness was compounded 
by the men’s low social status.  For the women in Edin’s sample, 
marriage offered a route to respectability, but “[m]arriage to an 
economically unproductive male means . . . permanently taking on his 
very low status.”58  Elijah Anderson makes a similar point in the opposite 
way, describing the dreams of teenage girls in ghetto neighborhoods as a 
dream of “living happily ever after with one’s children in a nice house in 
a good neighborhood—essentially the dream of the middle-class 
American lifestyle.”59  In these cases, it is the social status of jobless 
men, their lack of esteem, as much as their material resources, that limits 
their appeal as husbands. 
If reliability and reputation measure the non-economic aspects of 
marriageability, incarceration has likely eroded the pool of marriageable 
men.  Just as the stigma of incarceration confers disadvantage in the 
labor market, it also undermines a man’s prospects in the marriage 
market.  Men in trouble with the authorities cannot offer the 
respectability that many poor women seek from their partners.  A prison 
record—the official stamp of criminality—can convey trouble to mothers 
looking for a stable home.  For example, Edin’s interviews described 
women’s aversion to drug dealing, even when it provided a couple with 
income: “Mothers fear that if their man gets involved in drug dealing, he 
might stash weapons, drugs, or drug proceeds in the household, that the 
violence of street life might follow him into the household.”60  Because 
marriage offers a way of enhancing status, the trouble foreshadowed by a 
prison record may be even more repellent than chronic unemployment. 
The stigma of incarceration also strains existing relationships.  
Erving Goffman describes stigma’s contagious quality, suffusing 
personal relationships: “In general, the tendency for a stigma to spread 
from the stigmatized individual to his close connections provides a 
reason why such relations tend either to be avoided or to be terminated, 
where existing.”61  Braman’s fieldwork in Washington D.C. provides 
empirical support.  The high prevalence of incarceration, he finds, does 
little to reduce its stigmatic effect.62  Braman describes the experience of 
Louisa, whose husband Robert was arrested on an old armed robbery 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 30. 
 58. Id. at 29. 
 59. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 151. 
 60. Edin, supra note 55, at 28 (citations omitted). 
 61. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 30 
(1963). 
 62. Braman, supra note 51, at 165–67. 
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charge after a lengthy period out of prison and in recovery from drug 
addiction. The couple: 
had come to think of and present themselves as morally upstanding 
citizens and churchgoers.  Because of this, Louisa felt the stigma of her 
husband’s most recent incarceration all the more intensely.  She began 
to avoid friends and family, not wanting to talk about Robert’s 
incarceration and lying to them when she did.63 
Louisa came to withdraw from her extended family and grappled with 
depression during Robert’s incarceration.64  Braman argues that the 
stigma of incarceration is even more severe for family members than the 
offender, because wives and children live and work outside the prison, 
exposed to the condemnation of neighbors and other community 
members. 
The separation imposed by incarceration also weighs heavily on 
relationships.  Interviews with ex-offenders suggest that the friendships 
that underlie romantic relationships are diluted by time apart.  Often 
women become more independent and self-sufficient while their partners 
are incarcerated.65  Just as Edin’s female respondents distrusted men’s 
commitment, Anne Nurse reports that her Californian sample of juvenile 
offenders were constantly suspicious of the fidelity of their wives and 
girlfriends.66  Often these fears were well-founded and many romantic 
relationships failed while men were still incarcerated.67 
Quantitative analysis of survey data is generally consistent with the 
field research.  Black single men are especially likely to remain 
unmarried if they have prison records.  The gap in marriage rates 
between black non-inmates and ex-inmates is estimated to be anywhere 
from twenty to two hundred percent.  Survey data point more strongly to 
the destabilizing effects of incarceration on couples.  Consider an 
analysis of the Fragile Families Survey of Child Wellbeing—a survey of 
mostly poor urban couples with infant children.  The survey shows that 
men who are living with the mothers of their newborn children are three 
times more likely to separate within the year if they have a history of 
incarceration.68 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 170. 
 64. Id. 
 65. ANN M. NURSE, FATHERHOOD ARRESTED: PARENTING FROM WITHIN THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 109 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 57–61. 
 67. See also Edin, supra note 55, at 28 (discussing how poor mothers react when the child’s 
father is incarcerated). 
 68. WESTERN, supra note 7, at 131–67. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF MASS INCARCERATION 
By the beginning of this decade, the family life of poor blacks in 
urban neighborhoods of concentrated poverty had become strained by 
mass incarceration.  Young black men who had never been to college 
were now routinely going to prison.  Family disruption and children’s 
experience with parental incarceration had become similarly 
commonplace. 
Growth in the American penal population amounted to a redrawing 
of the rules of citizenship.  “Full membership in the community,” in T.H. 
Marshall’s phrase, was denied to those who carried the stigma of a prison 
record.69  Facing an array of diminished life chances and a social 
experience wholly outside of the mainstream of American life, the 
formerly incarcerated and their families occupy a second-class position 
in which racial and class disadvantage congeals into an inferior social 
status. 
How might mass incarceration be reversed?  Reducing prison 
populations is so far barely on the agenda of elected officials, and its 
specter carries great political risk.  Still, state budgets are stressed by 
correctional expenditures, and social supports for prisoners reentering 
society has been a lively area of activity for city governments and local 
non-profit organizations.  Some states too are reconsidering their most 
draconian drug sentencing laws.  Thus there are faint signs that the 
tough-on-crime movement has lost a little of its momentum. 
While an expanded reentry policy and a revision of the penal codes 
may stop the growth of prisons and jails, the future of mass incarceration 
depends very much on its past.  A less punitive criminal justice system 
cannot by itself solve the deep social problems of poor urban 
neighborhoods.  These problems—of disorder and addiction largely 
flowing from chronic idleness—set in motion the politics and policy 
choices that delivered mass incarceration.  As America’s meager welfare 
state failed to prevent school dropout and chronic unemployment among 
unskilled inner-city residents, prisons and jails expanded to fill the 
vacuum of social control formerly occupied by the education system and 
the labor market.  Police, courts, and correctional administrators were 
charged to solve the social problems of idleness, addiction, and mental 
illness, while also controlling their natural jurisdiction over serious 
crime.  But they were given only a few tools: the powers of arrest and 
imprisonment.  Mass incarceration contained an unruly population beset 
                                                          
 69. MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 70. 
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with trouble; wholesale confinement made the population more 
manageable but left their troubles undiminished. 
To expect a rehabilitative criminal justice system by itself to reverse 
mass incarceration would, in an odd way, repeat the mistakes of the 
tough-on-crime movement.  We would again be turning to line officers to 
manage the by-products of deep social inequalities.  While we might 
spend billions on a jobs program for former prisoners, we would still 
send them out to look for work in labor markets where half the young 
men are jobless, while staying sober amid a thriving street trade in illegal 
drugs.  Prisoners understand this when they say they are set up to fail.  
This is not just a recidivist’s special pleading; it reflects the deficiencies 
of a theory in which society’s losers have only themselves to blame. 
Reversing mass incarceration will ultimately require that social 
problems be solved with social policies.  The two most urgent priorities 
are the prevention of school dropout and the creation of a viable and 
legitimate economy in poor inner-city neighborhoods.  Not even the most 
rehabilitative criminal justice policy can by itself solve these problems.  
We normally think of education and employment as sources of economic 
opportunity.  In the era of mass incarceration we also see that they are 
positive sources of social control, providing order in people’s daily lives. 
In sum, just as mass incarceration has diminished the quality of 
American citizenship and created a second-class status among poor black 
families, an expansion of social citizenship can redress the balance.  The 
political will for such an effort will likely lie in universalistic policies 
that aim to raise the social standard for all, rather than just for the most 
disadvantaged.  Universal provision—and the bonds of citizenship on 
which it is built—joins us to a common destiny and might be the best 
chance for the redevelopment of urban schools and labor markets.  If the 
duty of the citizen is to stay in school and go to work, then the political 
will to maintain good schools and promote employment is woven into 
the social fabric.  This political logic implies that special projects that 
target special populations will not do the job.  If poor schools are to 
improve, it is more likely to result from a national effort to improve 
educational opportunity across the board.  If we are to promote jobs for 
unskilled men in the inner-city, such an effort will receive the greatest 
impetus from a national employment policy that aims to improve the 
working lives of all citizens.  Clearly, we are not there yet.  The norms of 
good citizenship, however, develop in tandem with the institutions of 
civic life.  Political will can grow in small increments led by the 
promotion of institutions that provide on the basis of what T.H. Marshall 
called our basic human equality.  Such a renewal of an authentically  
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American social citizenship would sweep away the jobless ghetto and the 
mass incarceration that it spawned. 
